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The Decision to Incorporatet
I. INTRODUCTION
It may appear somewhat anomalous to begin a symposium on
corporation law with the suggestion that the corporate form is
overused. However, as will be developed herein, several of the so-
called advantages of incorporation may prove to be illusory in any
given situation.
Recent figures indicate that the number of new corporations is
on the rise, with more than eleven new Nebraska corporations and
more than sixty-eight new Delaware corporations being formed
each business day.' In fact, in Delaware the number of new incor-
porations has increased by more than fifty percent in the four-year
* Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law; BA. 1969, J.D. 1972, Colum-
bia University.
f This introductory piece is not intended as a comprehensive analysis but
rather is aimed at raising some questions to be considered in selecting the
form of enterprise. For a more detailed discussion of the issues raised
herein, see the authorities cited in notes 4, 13 infra.
1. The following chart depicts this rapid growth in domestic corporations based
on figures supplied by the Nebraska and Delaware departments of state.
Table I
New incorporations Increase over Increase over New incorporations
Year per year prior years 1975 per business day
Number Percent Number Percent
Nebraska
1975 2,555 10.2
1976 2,578 23 0.9 23 0.9 10.3
1977 2,753 175 6.8 198 8.0 11.0
1978 2,851 98 4.0 296 12.0 11.4
Delaware
1975 11,328 45.3
1976 12,949 1,621 14.3 1,621 14.3 51.8
1977 14,838 1,889 14.6 3,510 31.0 59.4
1978 17,129 2,291 15.4 5,801 51.0 68.5
Letter from Marie C. Schulte, Delaware Department of State, Division of Cor-
porations, to Thomas L. Hazen (January 23, 1979); Letters from Kathy Meyer,
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period since 1975.2 Although incorporation of an enterprise can
provide great benefits from both a structural and tax perspective,
planners should not be too quick to opt for the corporate form.
11. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE
CORPORATE FORM
Especially when confronted with a smaller business con-
cern3 -defined in terms of both the number of owners and size of
the enterprise-the planner may adopt incorporation without giv-
ing sufficient thought to other business forms because one or more
of the corporate advantages seems attractive. However, there are
two factors which must not be forgotten: (1) that along with the
advantages there may be countervailing drawbacks, and (2) that
many of the advantages may be available in the partnership form
as well. It follows that one must carefully examine and balance
the advantages and drawbacks as well as the availability of alter-
native structures before adopting the corporation as a modus oper-
endi.
Limited liability of the owners usually heads the list of benefits
flowing from use of the corporate form. This is followed by free
transferability of ownership interests and perpetual existence,
which guarantees continuity of life of the enterprise. Of particular
importance are flexibility in management structuring and, in par-
ticular, centralization of management. Another advantage is flex-
ibility of capital structure. These advantages of corporate form are
oft-quoted and have become legion. 15 Still further advantages can
Nebraska Department of State, to Thomas L Hazen (January 22, 1979; April 5,
1979).
2. See Table I, supra note 1.
3. The scope of this introductory piece is limited to the smaller enterprise. As
the number of owners grows, the corporate form becomes more inevitable
with the slight exception of the few larger enterprises that may be carried on
as limited partnerships, unincorporated associations, or as business trusts.
4. For example, in his treatise on corporations Professor Ballantine listed six
corporate advantages:
(1) The capacity to act as a legal unit, to hold property, to contract, to
sue and be sued as a distinct entity; (2) limitation of or exemption
from individual liability of shareholders; (3) continuity of existence;
(4) transferability of shares; (5) centralized management by the
board of directors; (6) standardized methods of organization, man-
agement and finance prescribed by corporation acts for the protec-
tion of shareholders and creditors, including a more or less
standardized system of shareholders' relations, rights, and remedies.
H. BAILLANix, CoaRoRATioNs 3 (rev. ed. 1946).
Professor Ballantine then pointed to the correlative disadvantages of the
partnership form which must be compared with the corporate advantages:
(1) lack of recognition of the concern as a separate legal person; (2)
danger of abuse of wide authority of co-partner. (3) risks of unlimited
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be found in terms of collateral benefits such as an exemption from
the usury laws and the availability of social security benefits to
persons who would otherwise be self-employed and thus ineligi-
ble.' 6
Balanced against these there are various disadvantages. There
are usually no filings required for a partnership or sole proprietor-
ship in contrast to the universal corporate requirement that the
articles of incorporation be on file with the state.7 The corporate
filings may also be accompanied by fees 8 and organizational taxes 9
far in excess of those accompanying other business forms. In addi-
tion to the filings there are other formalities such as the require-
ments of annual shareholder and formal director meetings,' 0 and
the necessity of written notice and minutes of shareholder and di-
rector meetings." The corporate form also requires the adoption
of a system of legal accounting that bears no resemblance to ac-
cepted accounting principles. 12 In terms of raising additional capi-
tal, corporate limited liability may be nothing more than a fiction.
Absent individual guarantees the extent of credit is limited to the
corporate assets and except in the most prosperous, low risk con-
liability in contract and tort for acts of partner and employees; (4)
precarious existence and risks of dissolution.
Id. at 6. See also, e.g., ALI-ABA Commi. ON CONTNUmING EDUCATION, THE LAW-
YER'S BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE MANuAL 7-21 (2d ed. 1978); 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5-7, 10-14 (rev. ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.12 (2d
ed. 1971); C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES §§ 2.01 to .51 (5th ed. 1975).
5. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-101 to -102 (Reissue 1974).
6. See Stark v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1960) (where this was the sole
reason for incorporating). But cf. Roccograndi v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Bd. of, 197 Pa. Super. 372, 178 A.2d 786 (1962) (denying unemployment
benefits since incorporation was a sham directed solely at procuring such
benefits).
7. ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 55 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
ACTI; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 103 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 41-2053 (Reissue 1977).
In addition, any plan of merger, consolidation, or dissolution must be filed as,
of course, is equally true of any amendments to th4 articles. MODEL ACT
§§ 74, 85; DEL CODE tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 1978); NEB.REV. STAT. §§ 21-2074, -
2084 (Reissue 1977).
8. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 103(c) (2) (1974); NEB. REV. .TAT. § 21-2053 (Reissue
1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. ACT § 104(e) (McKinney 1966).
9. E.g. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-303 (Reissue 1977) (annual occupation tax); N.Y. TAx
LAw § 180 (McKinney 1966).
10. E.g., MODEL ACT §§ 28, 29, 43; DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 141, 211-213 (Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2027, -2029, -2042 (Reissue 1977).
11. E.g., MODEL ACT §§ 28, 29, 43; DEL CODE tit. 8, §§ 141, 211-213 (Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2027, -2029, -2042 (Reissue 1977).
12. E.g., MODEL ACT §§ 2(j), 45, 46; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 154 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 21-2002(8)-(15), -2043, -2044 (Reissue 1977). See generally B. MANNING, A
CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL (1977).
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cerns, creditors will not generally advance funds without such
guarantees.
In addition to the above-mentioned issues the planner must be
aware of taxation factors.13 A corporation is a taxable entity apart
from its owners,14 unlike the partnership or sole proprietorship, in
which all income, including gains and losses, is passed through to
the individual taxpayers. 5 To the extent that the entity pays out
profits in the form of dividends taxable to the shareholders, the
corporate profits are subject to double taxation. An alternative to
distributing corporate profits is to reinvest them for expansion or
improvement of the business.' 6 This method of operation allows
the ownership shares to appreciate in value and results in capital
gain treatment upon sale of the interest. Although the capital
gains tax on the appreciated value of the stock is still a form of
double taxation, it is less vigorous than the taxation of compensa-
tion or dividends as ordinary income.
A subchapter S election enables a corporation to enjoy quasi-
partnership tax treatment and thereby avoid being a separate tax-
able entity with respect to corporate income.'7 However, the tax
code places additional restrictions on the subchapter S corpora-
tion 18 which often make the election impractical or unattractive.
13. See generally Z. CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLD-
ERS (1974); D. HERWrrZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 76-188 (1966). C. ROHRLICH,
supra note 4, §§ 301-312. The tax aspects of the partnership form must also be
kept in mind. See generally W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS (1977); A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION (1976).
14. LR.C. § 6012(a) (2).
15. LR.C. § 701.
16. If cash or unrelated investments "are permitted to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business" in order to avoid taxation on dividend dis-
tributions, the corporation will be subject to the accumulated earnings tax in
addition to other corporate taxes. LR.C. §§ 531-537.
17. LR.C. § 1372. The subchapter S election does not, of course, result in partner-
ship tax treatment for all purposes as the corporation is still subject to many
of the provisions of subchapter C. For example, corporate treatment applies
to liquidations and reorganizations. I.R.C. §§ 331-368. In addition, subchapter
S taxation differs from partnership taxation in treatment of cash distribu-
tions (compare LR.C. § 1373 and Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(d) (1959), amended,
T.D. 6960 (1968) with ILR.C. § 731(a)); net operating loss carryovers (compare
LR.C. § 1374 with I.I.C. §§ 702, 172); and capital gains (compare I.R.C.
§ 702(a) (2) with I.R.C. § 1378). See generally I. GRANT, SUBCHAPTER S TAxA-
TION (1974).
18. A subchapter S corporation is limited to 15 shareholders all of whom must be
individuals, except for estates and certain trusts, I.R.C. § 1371(a) (2); more-
over, a shareholder may not be a nonresident alien, I.R.C. § 1371(a) (3). The
corporation can have only one class of stock, I.R.C. § 1371 (a)(4), and a certain
percentage of the business must consist of active rather than passive invest-
ments, I.R.C. § 1372(e) (5). Additionally, subchapter S status may be adopted
only by unanimous shareholder consent, I.R.C. § 1372(a), and may be termi-
[Vol. 58:627
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At the other end of the spectrum is the fact that as a partnership
takes on more of the characteristics normally associated with the
corporate form, it runs the risk of being subject to subchapter C's
provisions for the taxation of corporations.19 These are but a few
of the tax considerations involved in selecting the appropriate
form of business. Although they may be the paramount considera-
tion in many situations, the remainder of this article will be limited
to nontax issues.20
The nontax disadvantages to incorporation such as the in-
creased formality and expenses of operation speak for themselves.
It is easy to see how they must fit into the calculus of the incorpo-
ration decision. Not as clear, however, is the extent to which the
advantages of incorporation may be illusory. The discussion that
follows is directed towards pointing out some of the pitfalls in rely-
ing too heavily upon the supposed advantages. It will become
clear that although the corporate form is preferable in a large
number of situations, it should not be routinely and mechanically
adopted.
A. Limited Liability
Common and preferred shares in corporations are nonassessa-
ble and accordingly-the shareholders' exposure to liability is gen-
erally considered to be limited to their initial investment. It
follows that any business planner is well versed in the general
black-letter-law proposition that shareholders of a corporation en-
joy limited liability. However, such generalities are overbroad and
may wane when applied to specific situations; this is especially
true in the context of the closely-held concern.
To begin with, as a practical matter a shareholder's potential
liability will go further. When a small incorporated concern de-
nated by unanimous agreement, LR.C. § 1372(e) (2). If the election is termi-
nated, the corporation is ineligible to reelect subchapter S status for five
years. I.R.C. § 1372(f). See generally Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 13, at § 3.01.
19. See generally W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMiRE, supra note 13, at 3.06.
The Internal Revenue Service has identified six attributes of corporateness
which may result in a partnership being taxed as an "association," or corpora-
tion:
(1) Associates,
(2) An objective to carry on business and divide the gains there-
from,
(3) Continuity of life,
(4) Centralization of management,
(5) Liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and
(6) Free transferability of interests.
Id. at 3-40 to -41 (footnote omitted). See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960).
20. For comprehensive treatment of the tax issue, see authorities cited in note 13
supra.
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cides to raise funds by borrowing, prudent creditors will require
the major shareholders to personally guarantee corporate obliga-
tions. Similarly, third parties contracting with the corporation will
often require performance bonds or individual guarantees by the
shareholders. Accordingly, at least until the enterprise becomes
well established and sufficiently stable in the eyes of outsiders,
limited liability will be limited in application to insulating the
shareholders against tort judgments.
In addition to the demands of the market place, there are vari-
ous judicially created doctrines that may be applied to extinguish
the shareholders' limited liability. Application of these doctrines
can work extreme harshness since the lack of predictability of re-
sult makes this an extremely difficult risk to anticipate and guard
against.
Although the courts have exhibited great reluctance to apply
the doctrine,21 thin capitalization may be the basis for piercing the
veil of limited liability.22 For example, in Minton v. Cavaney,23
Justice Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme Court, held
that *shareholders of a corporation operating a swimming pool
could be held personally liable for a tort judgment against the cor-
poration due to their failure to adequately capitalize the business
and thereby provide a cushion to absorb the foreseeable risks of
the enterprise.24
Another basis for piercing through the corporation to the share-
holders' personal assets is a finding by the court that the share-
holders disregarded the corporate entity by operating the
corporation as their "alter ego."' 25 In applying the alter ego analy-
sis, the courts look to such factors as the failure to segregate funds,
21. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 23 N.Y.2d 714, 244 N.E.2d 55, 246 N.Y.S.2d 362
(1968). But see, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 641 (1961).
22. See generally C. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 109-49 (4th
unabr. ed. 1969); FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 44.1; R. HAMILTON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 194-220 (1976); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS
250-72 (2d ed. 1970).
23. 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
24. The tort victim had drowned due to negligence in the operation of the pool.
The court held that the operation of a pool creates certain foreseeable risks
which must be taken into account in capitalizing the corporation. But cf. Wal-
kovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (refus-
ing, over a vigorous dissent, to pierce the veil of thinly capitalized taxi
company, relying on the corporation's compliance with New York's minimum
automobile liability insurance policy).
25. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 23 N.Y.2d 714, 244 N.E.2d 55, 246 N.Y.S.2d 362,
affid, 29 A.D.2d 763, 287 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1968). But cf. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry.,
244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (court refused to pierce veil although some of
formalities of separate corporate forms disregarded by parent and subsidiar-
ies).
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the failure to keep separate books, and the absence of arm's-length
dealings between the principal shareholders and the corporation. 26
Other activities that falinto this category include the failure to
follow corporate formalities such as keeping minutes of the re-
quired shareholder and director meetings. To the extent that such
a failure exists, as is the case with defective incorporation ab ini-
tio,27 there is the risk that the shareholders will be held personally
liable for the obligations of the corporation. It follows that the dili-
gence required to maintain the de jure corporate existence is a sig-
nificant burden of corporate form.
The cases indicating that the veil may be pierced for noncompli-
ance with corporate formalities present an interesting quandry.
On the one hand, in line with the growing trend of cases recogniz-
ing the special needs of the closely-held concern-or "incorporated
partnership"28- -, courts have been willing to forgive such noncom-
pliance.2 9 In such decisions it is reasoned that insofar as the par-
ties in selecting the corporate form wanted to retain flexibility in
defining the parties' relative rights, the courts should recognize
this fact in upholding the form selected. Accordingly, special
agreements and other devices which might otherwise run afoul of
corporate norms and formalities are not only tolerated but are en-
couraged in the close corporation context.30 However, if share-
holders rely on the leniency of this line of cases, they run the risk
that their informality will lead to the piercing of the corporate veil
and the concomitant elimination of limited liability.
The foregoing discussion should not be taken to indicate that
limited liability is too easily lost. This is not the case, as the corpo-
rate veil is a benchmark of corporate life. On the other hand, pierc-
ing the veil is a risk which should not be minimized. When this
risk is coupled with the likelihood that creditors and other third
parties will often require personal guarantees before dealing with
the corporation, it would be a mistake to give limited liability too
much weight in deciding whether or not to incorporate.
26. See, e.g., Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super. 351, 263 A.2d 188 (1970); Bartle v.
Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
27. See, e.g., Frontier Ref. Co. v. Kunkel's, Inc., 407 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1965); Robert-
son v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1964); MODEL ACT § 146.
28. See, e.g., Cressy v. Sharmon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978); Cain v. Cain, 75 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 1121, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975); Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). See gener-
ally 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 4; Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy
Partnership Advantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L.
REv. 427 (1953); Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partner-
ship, 18 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. 435 (1953).
29. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 IlM. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
30. See generally A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CORPORATIONS 540-616 (2d ed. 1977); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 4.
1979]
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A final point to be kept in mind in deciding whether to incorpo-
rate is the alternative availability of the limited partnership form
of operation.3 1 Although the limited partnership is frequently
thought of as a vehicle for establishing tax sheltered invest-
ments,32 it is also a viable alternative to the corporate form for
small businesses. The primary drawbacks of this form are (1) the
limited partners' inability to actively participate in management 33
and (2) the general partner's unlimited personal exposure to liabil-
ity.34 Accordingly, the limited partnership interest represents a
passive investment which may not meet the participants' objec-
tives if they desire some control over their investment. The unlim-
ited liability of the general managing partner may be minimized by
incorporation of the general partner.3 5 However, the passivity of
the limited partners' investment is not as readily avoidable since
31. See, e.g., UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter cited as ULPA];
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-201 to -232 (Reissue 1976). See generally PLI, LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS: INVESTMENT VEHICLES IN TRANSITION (1975); Coleman &
Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited Partnership Planning, 30 Sw. L.J.
887 (1976); Kratovil & Werner, Fixing up The Old Jalopy-Modern Limited
Partnership Under the ULPA, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 51 (1975); Lewis, The Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1917); Comment, The
Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895 (1936).
In 1976 the ULPA was withdrawn and replaced by the REVISED UNIFORM
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT [hereinafter cited as REVISED ULPAI. To date the
revised act has not been adopted in any jurisdiction. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT.
117 (Supp. 1979). See Hecker, The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act:
Provisions Affecting the Relationship of the Firm and its Members to Third
Parties, 27 KAN. L. REV. 1 (1978); Symposium: Limited Partnership Act, 9 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 441 (1978).
32. See generally Aslanides, Cardinali, Haynsworth, Lane & Niesar, Limited Part-
nerships-What's Next and What's Left, 34 Bus. LAw. 257 (1978); Dailey &
Gaffney, Anatomy of a Real Estate Tax Shelter: The Tax Reform Scalpel, 55
TAxES 127 (1977); Comment, The Limited Partnership as a Vehicle for Syndi-
cated Real Estate Investment: Selected Tax Considerations, 1973 WIs. L. REV.
1124; Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards
The Tax Shelters, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 408 (1977).
33. ULPA § 7; REVISED ULPA § 303; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-207 (Reissue 1976). See
generally Abrams, Imposing Liability for "Control" Under Section 7 of The
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 785 (1978); Feld,
The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV. 147] (1969);
Feldman, The Limited Partner's Participation in the Control of the Partner-
ship Business, 50 CoNN. B.J. 168 (1976).
34. The general partner has the same exposure to liability as in a general part-
nership. Even incorporation of the general partner will not always assure
limited liability. See 7 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 745 (1976). But see Recent Develop-
ments, Limited Partnership-Limited Control Through a Corporate General
Partner, 53 WASH. L. REV. 775 (1978).
35. For a recent case refusing to pierce the corporate veil of the general partner,
see Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 562 P.2d
244 (1977). Contra, Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
See note 34 supra.
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their limited liability is quite fragile and thus very easily set aside
for taking an active role in management.3 6 While it follows that the
limited partnership may not be a viable alternative in many situa-
tions, its utility under appropriate circumstances should not be un-
derestimated. This form of operation is one way to assure limited
liability while at the same time preserving the flexibility and lack
of formality of the partnership form.
Another factor in evaluating the importance of limited liability
is the availability and cost of insurance to cover the risks of the
enterprise. While it is impossible to insure against a general busi-
ness failure, many of the risks are insurable. For example, any
business involving the use of motor vehicles will want adequate
liability insurance37 as would any business owning real property.
The nature of the business and the potential exposure of the own-
ers to liability will necessarily be factors, but in many instances
insurance may make even the general partnership a viable busi-
ness form despite its lack of limited liability protection.38
B. Continuity of Existence
Under many of the current corporate chartering statutes, a pro-
vision in the articles of incorporation may provide for perpetual
existence.39 A slight variation that appears in some of the other
acts is that corporate duration is perpetual unless a shorter period
is provided for in the articles.40 This possibility of immortality con-
trasts to the black letter common law rule that a partnership dis-
solves whenever a general partner ceases to hold that position
whether it be by virtue of death, withdrawal, or transfer of the
partnership interest.4 '
While under the Uniform Partnership Act a conveyance of a
partner's interest does not of itself dissolve a general partner-
ship,42 all of the remaining members may decide to dissolve the
36. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 31, at 897-906; Crane, Are Limited
Partnerships Necessary?, 17 MinN. L REV. 351, 353-55 (1933); Lewis, supra
note 31, at 719-20; Comment, supra note 31, at 895-99; Recent Developments,
supra note 34, at 785 n.39.
37. Cf Walkovszky v. Carlton, 23 N.Y.2d 714,244 N.E.2d 55, 246 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1968)
(refusing to pierce the corporate veil in an automobile injury where the cor-
poration had complied with the state's minimum liability insurance require-
ments).
38. Cf. Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961)
(discussed in note 24 & accompanying text supra).
39. E.g., MODEL ACT § 45(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2052(b) (Reissue 1977).
40. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b) (5) (1974).
41. See H. HENN, supra note 22, § 26. See generally Bromberg, Partnership Disso-
lution-Causes, Consequences and Cures, 43 TEx. I- REv. 631 (1965).
42. UNIFORm PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27(1) [hereinafter cited as UPA]; NEB. REv.
STAT. § 67-327(1) (Reissue 1976).
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entity without breaching the partnership agreement.43 Neverthe-
less, under the Act either the death or bankruptcy of any partner
still operates as an automatic dissolution.44 In addition, a person
may not become a member of the partnership without the unani-
mous consent of the existing partners.45 In the case of a limited
partnership, the limited partnership interests are assignable if so
provided in the partnership certificate.4 The withdrawal, death or
insanity of a general partner dissolves the partnership pro tanto
unless the business is carried on by the remaining general part-
ners either with the consent of all members or pursuant to a preex-
isting provision in the partnership agreement.47
A reading of the current statutory provisions governing partner-
ships makes it clear that a corporation's perpetual existence is not
unique. Except in the case of a limited partnership with a sole
general individual partner, the partners may in essence provide for
perpetual existence.4 8 However, since this is one of the key char-
acteristics of corporateness, under the tax laws, perpetual exist-
ence may cause the partnership to be taxed as a corporation.49
With a general partnership, a contractual arrangement extrinsic to
the partnership agreement between and among all of the general
partners to reform the partnership after death will probably not
suffice to ensure continuity through specific performance, but will
at least give a remedy in damages for breach of contract.5 0 The
damage remedy does not go far in guaranteeing continuity, espe-
cially since in many cases breach and payment of damages may be
economically advantageous to the dissident partner. As noted
above, in the case of a limited partnership with a single general
partner, incorporation of the general partner assures continuity of
existence.
An additional factor in evaluating the importance of perpetual
43. UPA § 31(1)(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-331(1) (C) (Reissue 1976).
44. UPA § 31(4)-(5); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-331(4)-(5) (Reissue 1976).
45. UPA § 18(g); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-318(g) (Reissue 1976).
46. ULPA §§ 2(1) (a) X & 19; REVISED ULPA §§ 201(a) (7), 702, 704, NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 67-202(a) X & -219 (Reissue 1976).
47. ULPA § 20; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-220 (Reissue 1976). It follows that the death,
retirement or insanity of the sole general partner will necessarily dissolve the
partnership. But see REVISED ULPA §§ 402, 602.
48. See note 47 supra.
49. See W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHUTMmE, supra note 13, 1 3.06[4] [a]; note 19
supra.
50. When incorporating the family farm or other business, the owners can pro-
vide for perpetual existence. For example, by deeding the land or other prop-
erty to the corporation and by adding a limited purpose clause, a dissident
shareholder may be prevented from dissolving the family corporation. How-
ever, with a general partnership the dissident could breach the contract and
compel dissolution under the statute.
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existence in selecting the corporate form is the fact that a corpora-
tion may be subject to involuntary dissolution. Failure to comply
with the required corporate formalities, including the payment of
franchise taxes, may result in an action by the attorney general to
dissolve the corporation51 This raises problems of predictability
similar to those that exist with the risk of losing limited share-
holder liability.5 2 A second type of involuntary dissolution may be
obtained at the behest of a disgruntled shareholder. 53 This may be
even more of a factor in the future to the extent that courts become
more willing to decree involuntary dissolution upon a shareholder
petition in order to accommodate the flexibility and needs of the
incorporated partnership.54 As a result of this unpredictability, the
planned duration of the enterprise may not always be a significant
factor in deciding whether to adopt the corporate rather than part-
nership form.
C. Free Transferability
As is the case with continuity of existence, 55 in most situations
the partnership form's limitations on the free transferability of
ownership interests need no longer be a significant factor in the
planner's decision to opt for the corporate form. The partnership
is not as restrictive as it once was. For example, as noted above, an
interest in a general partnership is freely assignable subject to the
unanimous veto of the remaining members.56 In a limited partner-
ship the limited partners may freely transfer their interests if the
partnership certificate so provides,5 7 while an appropriate provi-
sion in the partnership certificate may provide for the transferabil-
ity of a general partner's shares. 58 Once again, however, the
51. MODEL ACT § 95. Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2094 (Reissue 1977) (upon receipt of
certification from the Secretary of State, the Attorney General is entitled to
file an action against a corporation for its dissolution). In Nebraska a corpo-
ration is automatically dissolved for failure to pay corporate occupation
taxes. Id. § 21-313.
52. See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
53. E.g., MODEL ACT § 97(a); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 284 (Supp. 1978). See generally
Comment, Deadlock and Dissolution in the Close Corporation" Has The Sa-
cred Cow Been Butchered?, 58 NEB. L. REV. 791 (1979).
54. Comment, supra note 53, at 814-24.
55. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
56. UPA §§27(a), 31(1)(c); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-327(1), -331(1)(c) (Reissue
1976).
57. ULPA §§ 2(1) (a)X & 19; REVISED ULPA §§ 201(a) (7), 702, 704;, NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 67-202(a)X & -219 (Reissue 1976).
58. ULPA § 20; NEB. REV. STAT, §§ 67-220 (Reissue 1976). Compare REVISED
ULPA §§ 402, 602. Placed in its proper perspective, the transfer of a general
partner's interest in a limited partnership is in reality a change in manage-
ment rather than a change in ownership. Sale of such an interest by the gen-
eral partner can create sale of control problems. See Hazen, Transfers of
1979]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
presence of free transferability may cause the partnership to be
taxed as a corporation. 9
Conversely, the increasing recognition of special treatment for
closely held corporations has led the courts to be extremely toler-
ant of share transfer restrictions.60 The types of transfer restric-
tions on corporate shares are many and can be readily adopted to
meet the needs of a particular situation.61 Also as the use of these
devices has increased, they have become far more sophisticated
and are most valuable not only as a means of maintaining limita-
tions of ownership but also as a device for resolving corporate
Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders-Common Law,
Tender Offers, Investment Companies-And a Proposal For Reform, 125 U.
PA. L REV. 1023 (1977); Note, Opportunity Lost: More of the Same in Sale of
Corporate Control Cases, 58 NEB. L. REV. 891 (1979).
59. See W. McKEE, W. NELSON &R. WHrrMiRE, supra note 13, 3.06[41 [d]; note 19
supra.
60. E.g., In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963) (great difference in
sale price and fair market value is not sufficient standing alone to strike down
a stock purchase option); DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 201-202, 349 (1974).
61. Professor O'Neal divides transfer restrictions into nine major categories:
Various types of restrictions on the alienability of shares have
been resorted to from time to time in attempts to confine share own-
ership to persons approved by the original shareholders. The re-
straints may be classified as follows: (1) absolute prohibitions
against the transfer of shares; (2) "consent restraints," requiring ap-
proval of transfers by the shareholders, the directors or a stipulated
percentage of one of these groups; (3) provisions limiting transfers to
specified classes of persons (e.g., families of existing shareholders or
the corporation's customers or employers) or prohibitions against
transfers to other classes of persons (e.g., competitors of the busi-
ness); (4) "first option" provisions granting the corporation, its of-
ficers or directors, or other shareholders a preemptive right
(sometimes referred to as a right of "first refusal") to shares which a
holder decides to sell; (5) options empowering the corporation, its
officers or directors, or the other shareholders to purchase some or
all of the shares of a holder on the happening of specified events
(e.g., his death, his becoming disabled, his becoming bankrupt or in-
solvent, his moving from the city where the corporation's principal
place of business is located, his acquiring an interest in a competing
concern or a severance of his employment with the corporation); (6)
buy-out arrangements for the transfer of a deceased holder's shares
(and probably those of a holder who becomes disabled) to the corpo-
ration or to the other shareholders at a stipulated price or at a valua-
tion determined by formula; (7) options empowering legal
representatives of a deceased shareholder to purchase the shares of
surviving holders; (8) provisions for the corporation's repurchase or
redemption of the shares of a holder who ceases to be an employee of
the corporation or provisions for the other shareholders to purchase
his shares; and (9) provisions for the redemption ("call") of common
stock at the option of the corporation or its board of directors.
These categories are set up only for convenience of discussion.
Actually the restraints are subject to almost infinite variation and
combination.
2 F. O'NEA, supra note 4, § 7.05.
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deadlock.62
An additional factor to keep in mind is the existence of judi-
cially created limitations on the transferability of corporate owner-
ship interests, at least where control of the enterprise is involved.63
For example, a controlling shareholder has been held accountable
for the subsequent looting of the corporation by the control pur-
chaser.64 Controlling shareholders who receive a premium too
much in excess of the per share value of their holdings may be
held accountable to the remaining shareholders. These limitations
on the sale of corporate control are based on various theories of
the fiduciary obligation flowing from the majority shareholders to
the minority.65 Along these lines, most significant to the question
of which form to select is the Massachusetts Supreme Court's
holding in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 6 6 and its progeny6 7
that within the context of the closely held corporation the share-
holders owe one another the same high duty of fairness as do
members of a partnership.68 In addition to providing another ex-
ample of recognizing the incorporated partnership, the rationale
employed in this line of cases minimizes the distinction between
these two forms of enterprise.
Although the mechanics may differ, in substance the variations
on transferability of ownership between the partnership and cor-
porate form are relatively slight. In both forms of operation the
interests can be freely transferable. Alternatively, as is frequently
the case, the parties may want to protect both themselves and the
business with the use of the types of transfer restrictions dis-
cussed above. Although in certain situations the designs of the
parties in fashioning transfer limitations may be better adapted to
the corporate form, in a vast number of situations this will not be
so. Accordingly, as is the case with the other corporate advantages
62. See generally Ludtke, Planning for Family Corporate Control, 58 NaB. L.
REv. 644 (1979).
63. See generally Hazen, supra note 58; Note, supra note 58.
64. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973); Insuranshares Corp. v.
Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (ED. Pa. 1940); DeBaun v. First Western
Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975); Gerdes v.
Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
65. Perlnan v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975);
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). But see, e.g., Clagett v.
Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978); Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d
949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
66. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
67. *E.g., Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978);
Cain v. Cain, 75 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 1121, 334 N.E.2d 650 (1975).
68. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
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that are discussed above, the significance of this factor in selecting
the form of enterprise should not be overestimated.
D. Flexibility in Structuring Management
In 1928 Benjamin Cardozo explained the extraordinarily high
standards of dealing that govern the partnership relation: "Joint
adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another.., the duty of
the finest loyalty .... [They are] held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behav-
ior.' 69 This is in sharp contrast to the negligence or even lower
standard of care generally applied to corporate management 70 to-
gether with the presumption that it acts within the broad range of
valid business judgment.71 In terms of general standards there is
clearly at least a divergence of emphasis in describing the nature
of the fiduciary relationship in these two forms of enterprise. The
apparent increased deference to the managers that exists with the
corporate form can be a distinct advantage over the partnership
arrangement. However, this is true only with the caveat that there
is a growing line of cases that apply the partnership standard to
the directors of closely held corporations. 72 Of course, in many sit-
uations the owners of the enterprise may want to protect them-
selves against a runaway management. In these instances the
higher fiduciary standard is an advantage.
Another divergence between the corporate and general part-
nership form is the centralization of management. The directors
manage the affairs of the corporation 73 and these directors, who
are elected by the shareholders, 74 in turn appoint the corporate of-
69. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
70. "[D]irectors are liable for negligence in the performance of their duties. Not
being insurers, directors are not liable for errors of judgment .... " Litwin
(Rosemarin) v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See generally H.
BALLANTmE, supra note 4, at 157-62; 1 FLETCHER, supra note 4, §§ 5-7, 10-14; H.
HENN, supra note 22, at 453-59; Shaneyfelt, The Personal Liability Maze of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 58 NEB. L. REV. 692 (1979).
71. See generally H. BALLA rIE, supra note 70, at 160-62; 1 FLETCHER, supra note
4, at §§ 5-7, 10-14;, IL HENN, supra note 22, at 482-83; Note, Section 21-2040.01:
Interested Director Transactions and Considerations of Fairness, 58 NEB. L.
REV. 909 (1979).
72. See notes 66-67 supra.
73. E.g., MODEL ACT § 35; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2035 (Reissue 1977).
74. E.g., MODEL ACT § 36; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(d) (Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 21-2033, -2036 (Reissue 1977).
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ficers75 over whom the shareholders have no direct control.76 In
contrast, the members of a general partnership are all co-manag-
ers.77 For example, any partner has both the apparent and implied
authority to bind the partnership in dealings with third parties. 78
Of course, utilization of the limited partnership form provides for
the same type of management centralization that exists with the
corporation. However, this is true only to a limited degree insofar
as in the limited partnership the management is not highly strati-
fied as readily as it may be in the corporation, 79 and too much cen-
tralization may result in the loss of partnership tax advantages.80
Certainly, to the extent that the enterprise in question requires
a sophisticated, stratified management structure, the corporate
form is preferable. However, the need for a sophisticated structure
is not typical, especially for the small business, but rather is a situ-
ation that may occur in a relative handful of situations.
E. Flexibility in Capitalization
The final corporate advantage to be discussed is, standing
alone, probably the most utilitarian and hence the most significant
in selecting the form of operation. The partnership basically pro-
vides for one type of equity or ownership interest with the one va-
riation presented by the limited partnership form.
Intrapartnership agreements can, of course, define relative priori-
ties in profit sharing with even more flexibility than is available
with the corporate form. However, planners may be reluctant to
rely on such contractual definitions because of unfamiliarity. The
various types of share classification and senior securities that are
available in the corporate form are expressly sanctioned by the
corporate statutes8 ' and have been subject to much judicial scru-
tiny,82 thus providing guidelines. The absence of statutes and case
law in the partnership setting gives more flexibility but provides a
lesser degree of certainty. This certainty in the partnership con-
text can only be provided by the far-thinking planner who is able
to anticipate and then draft provisions to cover all contingencies
with respect to the desired preferences.
75. E.g., MODEL ACT § 50; DEL CODE tit. 8, § 142 (Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2048 (Reissue 1977).
76. While the shareholders may remove directors, only the directors can remove
officers. E.g., MODEL ACT § 51; NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2049 (Reissue 1977).
77. UPA § 18(e); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-318(e) (Reissue 1976).
78. E.g., UPA § 9; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-309 (Reissue 1976).
79. In addition to the stratification of corporate management as a result of the
presence of both officers and directors, another example of this flexibility in
structuring is the use of the committee system. MODEL ACT § 42; DEL. CODE
tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2041 (Reissue 1977).
80. See W. MCKEE, W. NELSON, & R. WHrrMInE, supra note 13, 3.06 [4] [b]; note 19
supra.
81. See note 85 infra.
82. See generally 1 FLETCHER, supra note 4, §§ 5-7, 10-14.
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With respect to debt financing, the chief difference between the
partnership (or sole proprietorship) and the corporation is limited
liability. However, this need not be a significant factor. As noted
earlier 83 it is not uncommon for a creditor of a closely held corpora-
tion to require the personal guarantees of the principal sharehold-
ers. Conversely, with a profitable partnership, a third party may
well extend credit with recourse limited to the partnership assets.
It follows that the significant difference in financing exists, if at all,
in terms of equity interests.
As has been already pointed out, the prime advantage to the
corporate form may be nothing more than the ease of adaptability.
The ability to issue voting and nonvoting equity interests is readily
provided by the statutory schemes.8 4 Additionally, corporate stat-
utes uniformly provide for preferred stock permitting dividend and
liquidation preferences. 85 And the ability to create hybrid securi-
ties having attributes of both equity and debt interests is available
with the corporate structure. Such devices include the right to cu-
mulative preferred dividends (debt),86 participating preferred in-
terests (equity),87 the corporate right of redemption (debt), and
the ability to have both debt instruments and preferred stock con-
vertible into common stock at the security holder's option.
To the extent that an enterprise seeks to take advantage of
these alternatives, the corporate form is a significant advantage.
However, for those who prefer partnership single taxation, sub-
chapter S status is limited in availability to corporations with one
class of stock.88 Thus, the true "incorporated partnership" is not in
83. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
84. In some states the use of non-voting common stock is permissible. E.g., DEL.
CODE tit. 8, § 151(a) (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2014 (Reissue 1977). In a few
jurisdictions there are statutory prohibitions against non-voting stock. See C.
CARY, supra note 22, at 255, 411. However, even non-voting stock is allowed to
vote for or against organic changes that would affect its relative rights. E.g.,
MODEL ACT §§ 59(c), 60; DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 242(c) (2) (Supp. 1978); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 21-2057(3), -2058 (Reissue 1977).
85. E.g., MODEL ACT § 16; DEL CODE tit. 8, § 151 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2015
(Reissue 1977). See generally Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Drafts-
manship, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 243 (1954).
86. A right to cumulative dividends means that the stated annual amount ac-
crues from year to year even when no dividends are paid in a given year, thus
entitling holders of the preferred shares to payment of accrued dividends
before any dividend on the common stock can be paid. Without such a right
the preference exists only on a one year basis.
87. Participation can exist with either dividends or liquidation rights and pro-
vides that in addition to a preference, i.e., standing in line before the common
shareholders up to a stated amount, there is a right to participate equally in
the remainder after the preference is satisfied.
88. I.R.C. § 1371(a) (4).
[Vol. 58:627
DECISION TO INCORPORATE
a position to take advantage of corporate flexibility in capital struc-
turing.
IL CONCLUSION
It has been admonished: "When in doubt, don't incorporate" 89
This advice is well taken. Indiscriminate use of the corporate form
will frequently result in a counter-productive situation in which
the expense, time and formality will far outweigh any benefit to
the enterprise. In deciding which form to adopt the planner should
take cognizance of the oft-times illusory nature of the advantages
discussed above. When viewed in the appropriate perspective and
when properly balanced against the known disadvantages, the op-
timal form of enterprise will be chosen through an informed rather
than a mechanical selection process.
89. H. HENN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 99 (1974) (quoting G.
SEWARD, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 8 (AI rev. ed. 1966)):
When in doubt, don't incorporate. Many small corporations are
formed inadvisedly. The corporate form of doing business is proba-
bly disadvantageous for a small new venture. The cost of the privi-
lege of limited liability will probably be too high. Not only is there
expense involved in forming and maintaining a corporation which a
sole proprietor would not have to pay, but there may be serious tax
disadvantages. The double tax on corporate income distributed as
dividends makes the corporate form of doing business basically unat-
tractive. Only by taking advantage of the exceptions and the unusual
provisions in the law is the corporate form made attractive for the
typical small venture. Hence a basic rule: don't incorporate unless
the advantages are worth the cost. Time devoted at the outset to de-
termining whether incorporation is advisable, will be well spent.
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